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Abstract: The paper deals basically with the mutual interference of politics and religion. It 
gives a short historical overview based on European and Hungarian examples and tries to shape the 
dominance of them in different ages and fields (heretic movements, Reformation, Counter-Refor-
mation, spiritual movements, Christian politics, political Catholicism, etc.). It describes how relig-
ious symbols or quasi-religious symbols can be/are used in politics as expressions for social and 
power efforts. It is dealing with the role of religion in nation-building in the past and present, with 
the role and formation of religious parties, of national and political myths. Politics has an important 
role in the re-christianization of Europe in the last decades, which can be observed not only in the 
post-communist countries, but elsewhere in Europe, too. Politics, political movements and ideolo-
gies (e.g. feminism) influence the everyday life of churches, causing debates and conflicts in govern-
ing church institutions. Religious movements can express and symbolise new ambitions and interests 
of given social strata and they can institutionalize, handle and conduct social conflicts (e.g. venera-
tion of Jesus Heart). Religions and churches play an important role in the post-revolutional transi-
tion of Eastern Europe. Religion can legitimize social effort, can express national(istic) thoughts, 
conflicts (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Armenia, today Romania, Northern Ireland, Scotland) or social 
tolerance (Switzerland, today Hungary, etc.). Religion has played an important role in colonializa- 
tion, having built new traditions, protecting given efforts and interest. But religion played an impor-
tant role also in decolonialization. Religion can be a basis of social pillarization also in the age of 
secularization. Secularization processes in the late 20th century politics are no de-sacralization 
processes at the same time. Secular movements, because they need legitimation, use signs, symbols 
which often can be found in religious symbolism (communist movements and parties, neo-pagan 
movements, etc.). The paper tries to interpret the secularization process. In my interpretation it is a 
privatization process of religion(s) and as result of the process emerges an individual/invisible religi-
osity.
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Politics and religion. Phenomena seemingly very remote from each other.
Politics and folk religion. The difference between these appears to be even 
greater since ‘folk religion’ is generally much more weakly institutionalized than 
‘religion’ in general, which, through its institutions, may have links to the institutions 
of politics and through the movement of the social structure may also be part of the 
processes of social change.
I would like to give a general overview in the light of our Conference of the links 
between these two areas, their problems and concepts as a possible approach to the 
topic.





What is politics? According to a synthesis of the various interpretations, politics, 
is the sum of actions and institutions aimed at obtaining the decisive, leading roles 
(dominance) within small and large communities and between communities, in other 
words, at winning power, and at retaining it, and expressing and representing inter-
ests. The views on the methods for obtaining, using and retaining power are ex-
pressed in ideology (GEERTZ 1994a; Zent ai  1997: 26-29). Politics is thus a special 
area of social relations and is specifically characterized by the manifestation of 
power and prestige. Politics needs, or may need, religious legitimation (Mol  n.d.: 
117). Behavioural constraints operate in the actions of homo politicus and abstract 
words, views, opinions and convictions, myths, fears, desires and aggressions, wills, 
role expectations and social norms are also present. All this represents a scheme of 
interpretation on which people base their actions (Edel man  1972: 31 cited in Szab ó  
1998:113; Zent ai  1997:11).
This symbolic interpretation of politics appears relevant for the problem chosen 
as the theme of our Conference, rather than other possible interpretations (seman-
tic, pragmatic, rhetorical, and communicative-discursive). Putting this in the simplest 
terms, everyday phenomena, events, expressions and things not only mean some-
thing but also acquire ‘significance’. That is, they become special vehicles of mean-
ing. The use of symbols is a widespread phenomenon at all levels of political life. It is 
sufficient to think of the material symbols (badges, coats-of-arms, buildings, posters, 
etc.), the actions (demonstrations, elections, political celebrations, conflicts and their 
management, etc.), and the conceptual language used, all of which are condensed 
signs, always referring to something else as well. The symbols also contain emotions 
and wills. Their main function is to integrate and orientate (Szab ó  1998: 95). Their 
use is very strongly linked to culture (Szab ó  1998: 96). Politics must provide an an-
swer on the nature of the world order (good - bad, self images and other-images), 
the legitimacy of power, the resolution of conflicts and shaping the future image of 
groups affecting the whole of society or forming part of the society. (Zent ai  1997: 
12).
This is similar in content to the religious scheme of interpretation of the world. Im-
portant features of political myths include simplification, personification and the bipo-
lar attitude. Practically the same determinants are found in religious interpretation 
too (Szabó  1998: 111 ff.). However, phenomena can only be interpreted in the given 
cultural context. They have a strong emotional charge.
What is religion? Most definitions of religion are based on the distinction be-
tween the supernatural and the natural. In other words, on a distinction between the 
sacred and the profane. But the texts, objects, persons, actions, institutions, etc. of 
religion(s) operate within a social structure.
Religion deals with sin, death and the fragility of public life. It pulls towards 
principles, virtues, ideals, and perfection. Politics, on the other hand, demands com-
promise, civility, secularity, and plurality. How then, are religion and politics to be 
related? They are not to be separated, as classical liberal theory implies, nor are they 
to be collapsed into each other, as theocratic or civil religion models propose. 
Rather, they are to interact at their overlapping and moving borders.
иPolitics and Folk Religion
And what is the folk religion that figures in the title of our Conference? The 
definitions of folk religion found in the history of science can be divided into several 
groups. 1. “Folk religion is the totality of all those views and practices of religion that 
exist among the people apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgi-
cal forms of the official religion.” (YODER 1974: 14). This definition is largely fol-
lowed in the Hungarian literature too by Sándor BÁLINT. (BÁLINT 1987: 10). 2. Ac-
cording to others, the religion of the ‘people’ is the religion of social groups far re-
moved from the mainstream of official church and social processes (BRUNVAND 
1996: 620). 3. The concept of folk religion as opposed to the culture of the elite is 
especially popular among a group of social historians and historical anthropologists. 
(Burke  1985; for a critique of this see: Freit ag  1991). 4. Leonard Norman Primi- 
ano calls folk religion ‘vernacular religion’ and, like the first group of definitions, 
defines its content quite broadly. “Vernacular religion draws attention to religious 
beliefs, practices, and experiences as they are understood, undertaken, and ex-
pressed by all people, modern and traditional, urban and rural” (Brunv and  1996: 
620). The opposition that appears in this definition is between an ideal of religion - 
the institutional, codified, set form of religion - and religion as experienced 
(Brunvand  1996: 620-621).
Seen in historical perspective, there is a wide range of countries where the reli-
gious phenomenon plays an important role (e.g. Israel, tribal states). The papers 
dealing with India at our Conference (Hiriyanna, Korom) show the important organ-
izing role of religion in the life of tribes and castes, the leading role of the priesthood 
in directing particular tribes, the use of local cults in everyday life, or the conscious 
use made of religious and quasi-religious symbols in the political activity around 
elections in regions with many different religions and many different cultures. In 
other countries religion played or plays a relatively small role (former USSR, social-
ist countries). This has also been the case historically. According to Huntington , 
the tensions are found along the differences between civilizations that are also de-
termined by religion (Huntington  1998; also cited by Kallscheuer  1996: 23; 
Barna  1998). This view also lies behind the history of philosophy conceptions on 
Central Europe (Barna  1998; Lendvai  1997). Multiethnic co-existence based on 
religious tolerance is less popular, less accepted today. (Kalls cheue r  1996: 18). 
Besides, this could only be achieved where there was a relative balance of peoples 
and denominations, that is, where none was in a position of dominance over the 
others.
The appearance of religion and the supernatural in politics can be observed in 
three areas: 1. government may be based directly on religion, as in a theocracy, 2. 
religion may give legitimacy to the power of the ruling elite, 3. religion may support 
the structures, formations and traditions that can be manipulated by those in power 
(Lewellen  1983: 66). The papers presented at our Conference are about this too, 
particularly the latter area.
According to researchers of religion one of the characteristics of social happen-
ings of the past two centuries and the present time is that religion and its institutions 
are occupying an ever smaller and more marginal place in the social structure. This
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is the process of secularization. It seems to me that one possible approach to the link 
between ‘politics’ and ‘folk religion’ is in essence the interpretation of the process of 
secularization.
One basic question in connection with the secularization of recent centuries is: 
what is the role of religion in today’s western society and what cultural forms has it 
assumed? While in the modern world religion has gradually become a ‘private af-
fair’, withdrawing to the area of the private sphere, globalization as an important 
cultural and economic process has transformed the whole society into practically a 
‘global village’. What role has been played and can be played by religion in this? 
Does it act within the process or remain outside it? Is it really true that religion basi-
cally operates outside the social structure? Is this why researchers on society and 
culture in Hungary, for example, devote little attention to religion?
It does in fact seem that religion and its institutions are in a marginal position in 
the structure of today’s society compared to the dominantly secularized institutions.
It can be said that the concept of individualization appearing in secularization, 
and the concomitant values of human rights, freedom, participation in the economic 
and political processes, and social justice all expressed in the concept of democracy 
coincide with the basic Christian notions of sacrality and human values and have 
been incorporated into the general European religious culture. On the other hand, 
while proclaiming the moral autonomy of secular political activity, politics recog-
nizes that political culture has religious links (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 135). The process 
supported by European Christianity shaped the demand and right to the private 
sphere (Casa no va  1996: 188). Examining the religious changes in Hungarian soci-
ety of the 1980s, Miklós TOMKA, sociologist of religion, was able to describe two 
related processes: 1. secularization, and 2. a process of de-secularization, that is, 
when religion emerges from the state of repression and rebuilds its institutions, per-
meating a part of social/political life (TOMKA 1988: 76). In the former socialist 
countries behind the Iron Curtain, the churches were practically the only stable 
ideological and organizational institutions during and after the political change. This 
is why their significance grew in the course of the political changes. As a result, a 
religious revival could also be observed in Hungary and elsewhere (KALLSCHEUER 
1996: 19). In the world freed from the domination of totalitarian ideologies and 
marked by increasing individualization and privatization, the pluralism of values and 
interests was also manifested in the adoption and/or creation of numerous new relig-
ious communities and movements (see: Barna  1999).
These findings can also be regarded as my paper’s points of departure.
In modern societies religion is present in the social structure to a far less extent 
than it was in earlier societies. At the same time, it is an increasingly accepted opin-
ion that religion cannot be considered only in its institutionalized forms. We know 
from practical experience that the ‘religious’ is present even without social institu-
tionalization, as folk religion, as new religious movements, as individual religiosity or 
desacralized rites, etc. In short, religion cannot be restricted to its institutionalized 
forms. Examining German politics and the religious dimensions of political culture 
in the 1980s, Rolf SCHIEDER wrote that religious symbolism was returning to politi-
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cal life and the world of political discourse (SCH1EDER 1987: 294 ff.). The same thing 
can be seen in Hungarian politics in the 1990s. In 1990-1994 our first democratically 
elected government consciously built on this language of religious symbolism, while 
in 1994-1998 the socialist (in reality returned communist) and extreme left-wing 
liberal coalition rejected this at the level of social discourse, although it supported its 
own power with quasi-religious symbols. The present bourgeois liberal and conser-
vative parties which have been in power since 1998 consciously accept - although 
with differing emphases - both religious legitimation and the use of ‘political relig-
ion’ drawing on Christian traditions.
What then is religion? Religion can be conceived in general (and from the an-
thropological and perhaps also sociological viewpoint) as a dynamic cultural phe-
nomenon, the embodiment of values, contents, feelings and symbols (Marti n  1978: 
13, - cited in Kokos alaki s  1993: 136). In this symbolical cultural interpretation, 
religion is directly linked to the fundamental existential interpretation of human 
conditions, to the notions people form of justice, freedom, good and bad. 
(Kokosalakis  1993:136; Geertz  1994b). The values accepted by society are often 
personified. The saints, individuals practising Christian virtue to a heroic degree, 
offered in the past and present life models that should or could be followed. In poli-
tics, too, there is a kind of secularized ‘cult of saints’ directed at political leaders, 
founders of parties, etc., which bears many of the external signs of religious cults. 
Various ‘values’ and interests are manifested in this, becoming patterns to be fol-
lowed or simply ideal types. This can be seen very strikingly in the 19th-20th century 
workers’ movement and in the 20th century totalitarian ideologies (celebrations, 
portrayals, ‘cult of relics’ - mausoleums, etc.) (See KORFF 1976). A similar cult 
emerged after the death of Princess Diana (see Marion Bowmans’ paper in this vol-
ume), and appears on the anniversary of her death. The different sets of values are 
present in everyday life as alternatives and people are attracted or repelled by them. 
In essence, such debating (religious and profane) sets of values are reflected in the 
political rhetoric of the Norwegian home mission (see Amundsen’s paper in this 
volume).
According to Dürkheim and Weber, the causes of changes in religions must be 
sought in changes in the structure of society. In this view, the marginalization of 
religious institutions reflects the decline of religion in society. But is this really true?
In the western world the magical conception of the world and the power of 
priests/churches have, in fact, declined in significance. But ideologies, including here 
the 18th century Enlightenment as well as those related to democracy in general, 
have never lost their metaphysical underpinnings. For they are based on faith and 
hope. Rationalism itself can never be purely rationalist (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 137). 
In other words: besides a rationality of purpose (Zweckrationalität) there also exists a 
rationality of value (Wertrationalität). According to the Weberian conception, even 
behind the entirely rationally interpreted, governable conception of the world, there 
must be a unique quasi-religious logic and characteristic. And even if ideology and 
religion are not the same thing, they are very closely related. The organization of 
modern economic life, the system of political institutions and social life is not based
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only on rationality and rationalization. These processes cannot dispense with the 
essence of religion either. In this way modern society shapes its own religious pro-
cesses and forms. (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 138).
The question is: if religion remains in today’s society, what is its social 
form/manifestation, and how are these forms related to the system/structure of so-
ciety? Despite the existence of a .process of . secularization, it can be said that.in re-
cent decades religion has not ceased to exist, it has not yet disappeared even in the 
developed western states and democracies. Indeed, we can observe a kind of revival 
of popular religion, as well as various forms of new religious movements, charismatic 
religions (see Barna  1999), occultism and New Age phenomena (Kok os al ak is  
1993: 139) which are being further strengthened by the mood of waiting for the end 
of the world that surrounds the millennium. A distinctive religious transformation is 
taking place at subjective level (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 139).
At the end of the 1960s (1967) Thomas Luckmann  wrote his book titled 
‘Invisible Religion’, in which he regards religion as a comprehensive anthropological 
category. He concludes that in modern societies religion has shifted from the collec-
tive level and consciousness, to the subjective and private sphere. In other words, 
Luckmann noticed that religion in the modern age has broken away and escaped 
from the social system (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 139). But this detachment is only one of 
appearance. Just as there is no personal language, so we cannot speak of a strictly 
only private/individual religiosity. Or another example, individual liberty can only be 
a product of collective work - in other words: can only be collectively secured and 
guaranteed (BAUMAN 1997: 7). Luckmann’s theory of ‘invisible religion’ is based on 
the assumption of a crisis of the institutional apparatus, [but] seems to be applicable 
only in certain cases, and does not destroy so-called church religion (Ciprian i 1984: 
30).
Church religion was able to strengthen beside individual religion.
In the 1980s and 1990s there has been an increase in the political significance of 
religion and religious fundamentalism. It became a decisive factor in conflicts in the 
Middle East, in the contradiction between Jews and Islam, and in the strengthening 
of fundamentalism in Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria and Dagestan. It is continuously 
present in Europe, in the Yugoslav conflict, and also in Transylvania where the Ro-
manian Orthodox Church does not wish to relinquish its dominance as the state 
religion. The ‘democratic’ government is still not willing to return the properties 
confiscated at the beginning of the communist period from the western Christian 
churches (Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Unitarian), but continues to 
support Orthodoxy. Another dimension lies behind this: the structuring and 
strengthening of the national identity.
All this indicates that the individualization and privatization of religion has not 
taken place, or not in the way that certain theoreticians believed they could see in 
the past decades, even though the theory of the privatization of religion is in line 
with the essence of western cultural development which gave the individual sover-
eign status. But this sovereign individualism became general and generally institu-
tionalized in the western societies. One of the stimulants of modern individualism
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was Christianity itself (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 140). At the level of community politics, 
personal religion is much more closely related to the feeling of democracy itself, and 
to the demand for individual and community autonomy and identity. Consequently, 
religion was able to return to the community arena at the level of both liberal and 
conservative politics. This can be seen in the political activity based on Christian 
values, and in the vigorous spread of new Christian movements from the USA to 
Europe and the whole world. This process can be strengthened by the growing 
dominance of Islam present in European societies to a growing extent, generating 
some kind of collective Christian response (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 141). This can be 
seen in the democratic political life being reorganized after the world-wide collapse 
of totalitarian atheistic regimes (from Russia through Albania to Cuba). This is why 
Cipri ani , on the basis of the Italian example, proposes introduction of the concept 
of ‘diffused religion’ (CIPRIANI 1984).
The privatization of religion is definitely related to the question of collective 
cultural and political rights and permeates society (CIPRIANI 1989, also cited in 
KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 141). In practice this means the spread of various forms of 
popular religion. The generally prevailing view is that modernity and popular relig-
ion are incompatible concepts and mutually exclusive aspects of social reality. There 
can be no doubt and it can be observed everywhere that the mediaeval magical 
thinking has basically lost its significance, but below the surface, there has always 
been a great variety of popular religion which was either tolerated or rejected by the 
institutionalized church and the state. An example in Hungary is the movement of 
Marian priests, the charismatic movement.
To a certain extent these social phenomena have in turn influenced theological 
thinking. While in the 1960s and 1970s the church wanted to modernize and 
‘demythologize’ religion, from the 1980s the aim was to stress the link between moral 
and religious values. The efforts of the church and religion for modernization and 
rationalization in a way resembled the similar efforts made in the 19th century, that 
is, to suppress popular religion, strengthen ecumenism and curb the cult of Mary and 
the saints that was weakening it. A striking example of this is the practice observed 
in the 1990s in organization of the church feast in Szeged Lower Town (See Puszt ai  
1999). Here, on the feast of the Blessed Lady of the Snows, in 1997 for example, 
there was no mention of the veneration of Mary, of the feast of the Blessed Lady of 
the Snows and its symbolical content, the organizers did not allow the small groups 
representing popular religion still present sporadically to have a say, but instead ~ 
involved them immediately in the organized and official liturgy (mass, adoration, 
litany). This obvious tension led to a shrinking of the previously wide region from 
which this place of pilgrimage had attracted pilgrims and it became of local signifi-
cance only.
The strong feminist movements that emerged parallel with the growth in the 
role of the individual brought the application of feminist viewpoints in all areas. 
While this is not yet the case for Hungary, in most countries of Western Europe 
feminist theology, a feminist interpretation of the Bible, etc. are no longer unaccus-
tomed phenomena. The social/political movement has in turn influenced religious
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thinking and theology. One sign of this was the strengthening of the veneration of 
Mary and the female principle that could be observed in the Swedish Church. I saw 
that portrayals of Mary are appearing in more and more Protestant churches, a sign 
that women want to play a role in the church, too. Another sign is the ordination of 
women as ministers in a number of Protestant churches (England, Germany, Hun-
gary, etc.), giving rise to many debates and splits within the churches concerned. The 
paper presented by Katarina Lewis deals with women’s roles and presence, with the 
confrontation between the Christian and modern conceptions of society in the 
Swedish Lutheran Church, the conflict between traditional female social roles and 
modern self-fulfilment. Under different social circumstances, for example in former 
Soviet Karelia, the role of women increased and it became their task to defend and 
pass on the faith, and to spread anti-communist, anti-atheist and anti-technology 
propaganda in their own families. This increased role of women declined after the 
political change and the male-centric church image strengthened again. Leonard 
Primiano writes about the religious practice of homosexual and lesbian believers, 
people the church previously did not know where to place.
The rapid changes that have occurred in the lives of individuals and small and 
large communities (emigration, changes of political regime = changes in the set of 
values), or the recurring economic crises of our times can also cause psychological 
insecurities. These demand a kind of religious security. Margaret Mackay speaks in 
her paper of the role played in the past and present by Calvinist hymns as a vehicle 
and expression of values. This psychological insecurity is probably also a factor be-
hind the strengthening of religious fundamentalism. The growth of religiosity in the 
various forms of popular religion can certainly also be of political significance at 
different levels, even if these forms are not part of the political structure of society. 
A number of papers deal with these aspects: the institution of monarchy, the link 
between civil religion and folk religion (Rowbottom), a distinctive religious practice 
and way of life developed under the totalitarian atheist autocracy (Küllős). Thus, 
despite the marginalization of religious institutions and the obvious autonomy of the 
basic institutions, religion and popular religiosity also appear in socio-economic and 
political contexts (Koko sal aki s  1993: 142).
It seems to me that the introduction of the concepts of ‘civil religion’ and 
‘political religion’ and the interpretation of their phenomena is a relevant formula-
tion of this duality. The idea of civil religion reaching back to Rousseau is also re-
flected in the opinion of many of today’s researchers. Although BELLAH’s book on 
the USA contains no definition of religion, J. A. Colem an  gives one, namely that 
civil religion is “a set of beliefs, rites and symbols which relates a man’s role as citi-
zen and his society’s place in space, time and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning” (cited by Bryan t  1995: 149). Bryant  adds to this that civil 
religions must set out the proper relationship between (civil) society and the state in 
securing a society’s place in space, time and history.
The concept of ‘political religion’ arose in the context of the policy of moderni-
zation and nation-building, especially with regard to Africa and the Soviet Union. 
Christel Lane  sees differences between the two kinds of religion. While ‘civil reli-
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gion’ connects the political order to a transcendent power such as God, ‘political 
religion’ simply presents a sacralization of the political order. ‘Civil religion’ confines 
itself to the political order, whereas ‘political religion’ claims authority over all social 
life (Bryan t  1995: 150). Among other differences, it can be mentioned that in con-
trast with the historical roots of civil religion, the phenomena of political religion 
often belong to the area of invented tradition. One can generally agree with the 
statements of Lane  that civil religion is celebrated in societies where the individual 
is dominant, and political religion where the (party-)state seeks to impose itself 
(LANE 1981: 44; Brya nt  1995: 150). Civil and political religions include political 
rituals, ‘the rites of rulers’.
RELIGION AND IDENTITY
Globalization, the general development of the market economy and the collapse 
of the socialist systems have revived not only the private sphere, but also the ques-
tion of individual and communal identity, as a contrary process and one occurring 
principally in a religious and cultural context (Kokosalakis  1993: 136). The uneven 
secularization of the European societies resulted in a culturally dialectic process 
between politics and religion, and in the continuous restructuring of religion and 
the social structure, ethnic and religious identities. There is a tension between the 
particular and the universal in this process. This is also a central problem of Christi-
anity.
In the wake of Dürkheim we can regard the link between religion and identity as 
axiomatic. Due to the close intertwining of religion and ethnic identity, seculariza-
tion is less strong in a number of European countries, such as Ireland, Poland, 
Greece and Malta, than elsewhere in Europe. In multicultural and multireligious 
regions, religious and ethnic identity may become intertwined. One such region is 
Ireland where the Catholic religion distinguishes the Irish (Cecil  1993; Mac -
dona ld  1993), or in Moldova, Romania where a section of the Hungarians have 
become Romanianized in their language but have not abandoned their Catholic 
religion.
The close intertwining of ethnic and religious identity on the one hand, and 
ethnic separation on the basis of religion on the other hand can be seen in the 
Yugoslav conflict. Where those speaking the same language can be distinguished 
on the basis of religion, they have their own culture and consciousness. Sa§a 
Nedeu kovió  speaks in his paper of the link between religious and national identity. 
He analyses the conflicts in the attitudes towards cosmopolitanization, individuali-
zation and the religious/historical traditions present in university life. However, 
people following the same religion but living in different language communities may 
differ because of the different cultural background, historical and social factors, or a 
different interpretation of history. (For example, the differences between Italian and 
Ukrainian Catholics living in Australia. - Lewins  1978).
In this way religious and national identity can become intertwined. In certain
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cases religion can help in shaping the nation (e.g. the Rusyns discussed by Bertalan 
Pusztai in his paper), or in the symbolic expression of a separate ethnic/cultural 
identity, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Hungarians living in Moldova. Reli-
gion is also intertwined with Europeanness. It seems to me that in political life today 
the political idea of the European Community is in a way a reformulation of the 
unity constructed (also) on a religious basis in mediaeval Europe. And while the 
European world is strongly secularized, even if to differing extents in the individual 
countries, Christianity can nevertheless be found as an ideological support behind 
the aspirations for European union. But there are debates over whether European-
ness extends to Eastern Christianity, to Orthodoxy, or remains within the confines 
of Latin Christianity, Roman Catholicism and the Protestant churches which grew 
out of it, excluding Eastern Christianity from the union. In my opinion there are not 
only differences of ecclesiastical administration, history, rule, liturgy, etc. between 
Eastern and Western Christianity but also a different cultural and civilizational 
background and it would be difficult to bring the two into line. Current official Ro-
man Catholic aspirations stress the overall Europeanness of the two trends. As a 
symbolical expression of this, in 1981 Pope John Paul II made Cyril and Methodius, 
too, joint collective patron saints of Europe (ROBERTS 1998: 195-198). This di-
lemma also finds expression in the proposed process of expansion of the European 
Union.
Others see in supranational Christianity accepted as the foundation of the 
European cultures, a force extinguishing and ending national and ethnic specific 
features. For this reason, in structuring their present national identity and providing 
it with an ideological underpinning they reach back to reinterpreted and recon-
structed forms of pre-Christian local religions and symbols. The use of archaic reli-
gious and historical symbols is one of the main ideological tools of the various forms 
of nationalism. I agree with the study of Agita Misäne and Torunn Selberg: in 
Europe (Baltic and Scandinavian countries) neo-paganism assumes mainly its Prot-
estant form. I am not able to see clearly why this should be so, since such movements 
are also present, among others, in Poland and Hungary (WlENCH 1998).
Today’s attitude towards life and everyday religious feelings are strongly influ-
enced by the approaching end of the millennium, something experienced by only a 
few generations in the history of mankind. Opinions and notions in this connection 
are largely built on religious symbols and ideas of past ages related to the end of the 
world, the thousand-year reign of Christ and the Last Judgement. People experience 
a general deterioration of the world in their everyday lives: wars, natural catastro-
phes, crime, corruption, hostility to the future (=refusal to have children), sexual 
licentiousness. They see all this as the result of globalization and the individualism 
that is strengthening parallel with it. Religious and ethnic fundamentalism is appear-
ing as a counteraction. This attitude is often the basis of disillusionment with Chris-
tianity and the turning towards pre-Christian cults already mentioned.
v
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In the opening paper I tried to outline some theoretical questions of the chosen 
topic of our Conference and its timeliness. What is politics? What is religion? Are 
there tensions, separation, or interdependence, interference, mutual influence, or 
co-operation between the two phenomena?
How can the questions raised be answered from the angle of the relations be-
tween politics and folk religion? The papers to be presented in the coming days will 
throw light on many details. However, we can say in general that the similar, sym-
bolical expression of interests and values makes the spheres of politics and religion 
related fields, and the forms of symbolical expression/behaviour are to a large extent 
similar or identical. Precisely because of the more or less overlapping fields of inter-
est and values, the forms of symbolical behaviour and the ritualization of actions can 
also be similar. Moreover, the secular authorities often gain or believe they have 
gained transcendent legitimation from religion, from the different forms in which 
religiosity is manifested and, in the final analysis, from reference to God.
On the other hand, examples of the links between national identity and religion 
show that religion, the religiosity of everyday life, the system of religious symbols, 
the values represented by religion/denomination have the symbolical power to shape 
communities, that is, they can join and strengthen people in their self-identities, self- 
awareness and their sense of communal belonging. In other words, in its operation 
religion also acquires immediate social/political significance. This is true in everyday 
religious practice, in the shaping of historical consciousness, and in the interpreta-
tion of religious and national conflicts. In both past and present politics and folk 
religion are interrelated phenomena that permeate and influence each other.
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